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ABSTRACT 
 
In this paper we examine the extent to which fairness considerations are salient to senior 
executives and consider the implications for agency theory, tournament theory, and the 
design of top-management incentives.  We look for patterns in a unique data set of senior 
executive preferences and seek explanations for these patterns using a model of fairness first 
advanced by Fehr & Schmidt (1999). We propose a number of amendments to Fehr & 
Schmidt’s model.  We challenge some of the standard tenets of agency theory and 
tournament theory, demonstrating why equity considerations should be taken into account.  
We add to the growing literature on behavioural agency theory.  
 
KEYWORDS: fairness; agency theory; tournament theory; executive pay 
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Introduction 
For over thirty years management scholars have been heavily influenced in the way that they 
conceptualise executive compensation by two economic frameworks. Agency theory 
(Alchian & Demsetz, 1972; Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Ross, 1973; Spence 
& Zeckhauser, 1971) postulates, inter alia, that in order to motivate executives (agents) to 
carry-out actions and select effort levels that are in the best interests of shareholders 
(principals), boards of directors, acting on behalf of shareholders, must design incentive 
contracts which make an agent’s compensation contingent on measurable performance 
outcomes.  Tournament theory (Connelly, Tihanyi, Crook, & Gangloff, 2014; Lambert, 
Larkin, & Weigelt, 1993; Lazear & Rosen, 1981; Rosen, 1982) extends the agency model by 
proposing that principals structure a company’s management hierarchy as a rank-order 
tournament, thus ensuring that the highest-performing agents are selected for the most-senior 
management positions.  Tournament theory postulates that executives compete for places in a 
company’s upper echelons via a sequential elimination tournament. It predicts that 
compensation is an increasing convex function of an agent’s position in the management 
hierarchy, with increases in remuneration between levels in the hierarchy varying inversely in 
proportion to the probability of being promoted to the next level. By implication, the 
compensation of the CEO, ranked highest in the tournament, will typically be substantially 
more than the compensation of executives at the next highest level.  
Both agency and tournament theories make standard economic assumptions about human 
behavior: agents are rational, self-interested and rent-seeking; their utility is positively 
contingent on pecuniary incentives and negatively contingent on effort; there is no non-
pecuniary agent motivation (Besley & Ghatak, 2005). Neither theory takes into account 
equity considerations (Bowie & Freeman, 1992; O'Reilly, Main, & Crystal, 1988). However, 
in recent years a number of management scholars have advanced a new version of agency 
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theory based on more realistic assumptions about behavior (Pepper & Gore, 2012, 2014; 
Pepper, Gore, & Crossman, 2013; Rebitzer & Taylor, 2011; Sanders & Carpenter, 2003; 
Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998). The intention has been to construct a better theoretical 
account of executive compensation and agent motivation.  To date, this approach, known as 
behavioural agency theory, has focused on attitudes to risk, time preferences and intrinsic 
motivation. Scholars have known for some time that fairness is also a key factor in 
determining whether employees are motivated by their pay, especially when comparisons are 
made with the compensation of other team members (Akerlof & Yellen, 1990; Clark & 
Oswald, 1999), (Card, Mas, Moretti, & Saez, 2012; Larkin, Pierce, & Gino, 2012; Nickerson 
& Zenger, 2008). Some management scholars (e.g., Gomez-Mejia & Wiseman, 1997; 
Schlicht, 2008; Wade, O'Reilly, & Pollock, 2006) argue that fairness is equally germane to 
senior executives as it is to other workers.  However, empirical evidence about top managers’ 
attitudes to fairness has historically been limited. 
In this article we ask to what extent are fairness considerations salient to senior 
executives? We examine the implications for agency theory and tournament theory and 
consider how the design of top-management incentives might be affected. In the first section 
we review the literature on fairness from multiple perspectives, before constructing a 
theoretical framework in which we define ‘fairness’, and ‘envy’, after Varian (1974, 1975) 
and Baumol (1986).  We combine these definitions with a utility function which reflects 
fairness and incorporates factors for ‘envy’ and ‘guilt’, after Fehr & Schmidt (1999). The 
second and third sections describe the research methodology and the results of the empirical 
study. We look for patterns in a unique data set of senior executives’ preferences collected 
from around the world and seek explanations for these patterns using a model of fairness 
proposed by Fehr & Schmidt (1999). The fourth section discusses the results and tests these 
against the general proposition that ‘fairness matters’ (Isaac, Matthieu, & Zajac, 1991). The 
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discussion section proposes a number of amendments to Fehr & Schmidt’s model of fairness, 
speculates on the role of greed, and examines the significance of the model for agency theory, 
tournament theory, and the design of top-management team incentives.  The concluding 
section incorporates comments on the paper’s limitations and contribution. 
 
Theoretical antecedents: Fairness, social comparisons and organisational justice 
Fairness has a normative dimension (i.e., ‘what should be done’?) and an ethical component 
(i.e., ‘what is just’?). There is an extensive literature on the relationship between fairness and 
incentives in various scholarly traditions, including moral and political philosophy (Bowie & 
Freeman, 1992; Cohen, 2008; Grant, 2002; Nozick, 1973, 1974; Rawls, 1971|1999, 2001), 
legal studies (Adler, 2012; Kaplow & Shavell, 2002), social psychology (Adams, 1965; Blau, 
1964; Deutsch, 1975b; Festinger, 1954; Homans, 1961; Leventhal, 1976), economics 
(Baumol, 1986; Isaac et al., 1991; Rabin, 1993; Varian, 1974, 1975; Zajac, 1995) and 
management (Folger, 1998; Folger & Cropanzano, 1998, 2001; Greenberg, 1982; Greenberg 
& Colquitt, 2005a; Greenberg & Cropanzano, 2001; Meindl, 1989). Rawls and Nozick debate 
the possible trade-off between equal distributions of wealth among persons, and distributions 
which incentivise activities that enhance the total wealth of society.  Rawls asserts the 
‘difference principle’, postulating that making a greater index of primary goods available to 
more advantaged groups is justified in so far as it adds to the index of less advantaged groups 
(Rawls, 2001: 61-63). Nozick challenges Rawls from a libertarian perspective with 
entitlement theory (sometimes known as the ‘Wilt Chamberlain’ argument, after the iconic 
American basketball player), contending that a person who acquires a holding of goods in a 
just manner, by means of a legitimate transfer, and from someone who was previously 
properly entitled to the goods comprised in that holding, is therefore justly entitled to those 
goods, even if he or she becomes inordinately wealthy as a consequence (Nozick, 1973: 57). 
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The difference principle provides the ethical justification for low-powered, muted, or as 
Roberts (2010) calls them, ‘weak’ incentives. Entitlement theory provides ethical support for 
high-powered, wealth-creating (‘strong’) incentives.  Cohen (2008: 87-91) contests both the 
difference principle and entitlement theory, proposing instead an egalitarian ethos which 
argues that economic efficiency in a fair society should not require some members to be 
provided with inequality-generating rewards. Grant (2002) views incentives as potentially 
coercive, so that the fairness, or otherwise, of incentives is an inherently problematic issue. 
Bowie & Freeman (1992: 50-51) call for the development of a specific theory of fairness that 
is appropriate to principal-agent relationships. 
Festinger (1954) takes a different approach, without the ethical overtones, with social 
comparison theory. He argues that we each have a drive to measure our abilities and 
opinions; that, in the absence of objective mechanisms, we evaluate ourselves in comparison 
with other people; and that, given a range of possible referents, someone close to our own 
abilities or opinions will be selected for comparison. Adams (1965) incorporates an 
assessment of differential inputs into the social comparison process, building on the work of  
Homans (1961) and Blau (1964).  Deutsch (1975b) points out that distribution logics are 
values-dependent and proposes that equity, as opposed to equality or need, will be the 
dominant principle of distributive justice only where economic productivity is the primary 
goal.  Alternatively, where maintaining harmonious social relations is a common goal, 
equality will be the dominant logic, and where welfare is the primary goal, need will be the 
guiding principle.  Meindl (1989) develops this line of thought in a managerial context, 
arguing that differential equity-based allocations are more desirable when workers are not 
operating in tightly-coupled teams, but less differentiation will be appropriate when the focus 
is on team-production. In other parts of the management literature ‘fairness’ is often used 
interchangeably with ‘justice’ (Greenberg & Colquitt, 2005b).  After an early focus by 
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management scholars on distributive justice (Deutsch, 1975a), an extensive organisational 
justice literature has developed, incorporating concepts of procedural justice, interactional 
justice, and, increasingly, attempts to integrate multiple justice dimensions (Colquitt, 
Greenberg, & Zapata-Phelan, 2005). Aspects of organisational justice other than distributive 
justice are beyond the scope of this paper. 
Varian (1974, 1975), and later Baumol (1986) make social comparison the basis of an 
economic theory of fairness. Fehr & Schmidt (1999) propose a model which, while making 
no reference to Varian or Baumol, nevertheless largely follows the structure of their 
definitions. Isaac et al (1991) advance what they call a ‘positive theory of economic fairness’, 
which they use to derive political and legal principles. Other economists (e.g., Andreoni & 
Miller, 2002; Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000; Charness & Rabin, 2002; summarised in Fudenberg 
& Levine, 2012) propose economic theories of fairness which are essentially variations on 
Fehr & Schmidt, but which allow for, inter alia, differential wealth effects and concave utility 
functions. 
In order to provide the analytical framework for the article we make a number of 
observations at this point. First, in this paper we have adopted Lindenberg’s ‘method of 
decreasing abstraction’, commencing with a simple framework and, in successive stages, 
incorporating additional assumptions as necessary on the basis that: ‘a model should be as 
simple as possible and as complex as necessary’ (Lindenberg, 1991: 117).  Secondly, as 
stated above, one of the main objectives of this paper is to challenge parts of agency theory 
and tournament theory. Although widely adopted by management scholars (Connelly et al., 
2014; Eisenhardt, 1989) and highly influential in the design of corporate governance 
frameworks (Daily, Dalton, & Cannella, 2003), these are both essentially economic models.  
Therefore, we have deliberately adopted an economic model of fairness as our starting point 
with a view to ‘challenging the economic paradigm from within’.  Thirdly, we recognise that, 
FAIRNESS, ENVY, etc. 
  
6 
 
in the context of a values-laden concept like fairness, normative and positive distinctions 
become intertwined.  Hume's law (an ‘ought’ cannot be derived from an ‘is’) does not 
proscribe the converse (i.e., there is no reason why an ‘is’ cannot be derived from an ‘ought’). 
Fairness cognitions influence fairness beliefs, which in turn affect fairness perceptions, thus 
motivating fairness behaviours.  ‘Should’ judgements (Folger & Cropanzano, 2001) involve a 
degree of what Mackenzie (2007) calls ‘performativity’. Thus, there is a de facto connection 
between normative and positive dimensions, justifying the multi-perspective approach that 
we have adopted in this paper. 
Analytical framework 
Varian (1974, 1975) and Baumol (1986) both propose similar definitions of fairness and 
envy, which we summarize as follows. For two individuals X (he) and Y (she): 
 
A distribution of goods is called fair if X prefers his own bundle of goods x to the 
bundle of goods y obtained by Y, that is, if X does not envy y, AND if Y prefers her 
own bundle of goods y to the bundle of goods x obtained by X, that is, if Y does not 
envy x. 
 
 
A distribution of goods is said to involve envy by X of the bundle of goods y obtained 
by Y if X would rather have y than the bundle of goods x obtained by X AND to 
involve envy by Y of the bundle of goods x obtained by X if Y would rather have x 
than the bundle of goods y obtained by Y 
 
These definitions are essentially mirror images. They are typically sparse definitions of 
the kind favoured by economists (Hausman, 1992).  It is important to note that, as defined, 
X’s envy focuses on the bundle of goods y, not the economic agent Y, and that, in the same 
way, Y’s envy focuses on x not X; X and Y consult only their own preferences and decide 
whether they would rather have the other person’s bundle of goods rather than their own. X is 
not required to know about Y’s preferences, and Y is not required to know about X’s 
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preferences; nor is the other person’s identity relevant (Baumol, 1986). Rawls (1971|1999 : 
466-7) calls this ‘benign envy’ rather than ‘envy proper’.   
Fehr & Schmidt (1999) propose a model of fairness which follows the structure of these 
definitions and which has become a standard in the economic literature. Assume that two 
players dislike inequitable outcomes. They experience feelings of inequity if they end up 
worse-off than other players in the game; let us call this ‘envy’. They also experience feelings 
of inequity if they end up better-off than other players in the game; let us call this ‘guilt’. If 
the two players are identified as X and Y, then X’s utility function in respect of a monetary 
payment, x, can be stated as follows: 
 
where vx is the value of the monetary payment made to X and vy is the value of the monetary 
payment made to Y. The second term in the utility function, i.e., αx max [vy – vx, 0], which 
applies if Y is paid more than X, represents envy. The third term, βx max [vx – vy, 0], which 
applies if X is paid more than Y, represents guilt. The relative weighting of envy and guilt is 
provided by the factors αx and βx, so that αx is the coefficient for envy and βx is the 
coefficient for guilt. Fehr & Schmidt assume that αx ≥ 0 and that 0 ≤ βx ≤ 1. No upper 
constraint is placed on αx, but they acknowledge that there may be a small number of subjects 
for whom βx < 0. We return to this point later. They also make the assumption that αx ≥ βx, 
i.e., that envy weighs heavier than guilt so that X’s experience of inequity will be greater if 
they are worse-off than Y, and less if they are better-off (Brown, 2001; Ezzamel & Watson, 
1998) 
From Equation 1 we derive the general principle that ‘fairness matters’ (Isaac et al., 
1991), in the sense that preferences are perceived to be unfair by some agents, who therefore 
make alternative choices which are not consistent with the standard economic calculus. This 
 UX(v) = vx – αx max [(vy – vx), 0] – βx max [(vx– vy), 0] (1) 
Factor for envy Factor for guilt 
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general proposition is tested empirically, along with a number of specific predictions which 
are identified below. 
 
Research methods 
We now turn to the empirical study. The data were gathered by an international research firm 
from its global panel of independent senior executives in 2011 using a questionnaire designed 
by the authors. A sample-frame was selected from the panel by identifying potential survey 
respondents, based on a list of pre-selection criteria (earnings, job title, company size etc.), to 
ensure that only ‘senior executives’ as defined for the purposes of the study were included 
within the sample. We define ‘top-management team’ and  ‘senior-executive team’  (hence 
‘senior executives’) as the group of very senior managers who are responsible for specifying 
and executing a firm’s strategy, who through their actions are capable of affecting the 
company’s profits, share price, reputation and market positioning (Carpenter, Geletkanycz, & 
Sanders, 2004; Hambrick & Mason, 1984). Individual invitations were issued by email to 
everyone in the sample-frame. Of 12869 relevant executives on the database, 756 agreed to 
take part in the survey, a response rate of 6%. The main demographics are set out in Table 1.   
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
A low response rate is not unusual in international surveys (Harzing, 2000) and is 
common in attitudinal studies of managerial elites (Pettigrew, 1992); it is to be expected that 
these two factors will compound.  In the present case, careful examination of the sample 
demographics showed that a wide range of ages, senior roles, company types, company sizes, 
industries and countries were represented in the sample. A series of χ2 tests for goodness of fit 
were used to test for differences between the demographic profile of the sample-frame and the 
sample; (t-test were not possible in this case because sample-frame means were not available). 
FAIRNESS, ENVY, etc. 
  
9 
 
The overall result was χ2 (df =62, n =756) =2.57, p < 0.005, indicating a significant degree of 
fit. At individual factor level the results were: job title χ2 (df =9, n =756) = 1.85, p <.001; age  
χ
2 (df =6, n =756) =.011, p <.005; gender χ2 (df =1, n =756) =.017, p <.25; country χ2 (df =25, n 
=756) =.055; p < .005; industry χ2 (17 df =17, n =756)  =.637, p <.005. The results indicate, 
with a high degree of probability, that the sample was representative of the sample-frame. 
Therefore, we were able to conclude that self-selection bias (Cascio, 2012)  was unlikely to be 
a problem in this case.  
The sample was segmented into three earnings bands: $350,000 and under (n = 506); 
$350,000 - $724,999 (n = 178); $725,000 or more (n = 72). Separate questionnaires were 
issued to participants in the three earnings brackets, with monetary amounts in each of the 
three questionnaires proportionate to each participant’s income level. For convenience, we 
report the findings in the main body of the paper by reference to the amounts set out in 
questions covering the bracket for executives earning $350,000 and under, which we refer to 
as ‘the base case’.  
Problem 1 
The first part of the study involved two pairs of questions which examined the impact of 
equity comparisons using an ultimatum game scenario (Guth, Schmittberger, & Schwarze, 
1982). An unusual feature was that participants were invited to assume the roles of both 
proposer and responder in turn, although the question did not take the form of a repeated 
game. The first pair of questions involved a relatively small amount at stake (referred to 
hereafter as the ‘endowment’) of $5,250 in the base case.   
In an experiment two people are brought together. Person X (he) is given $5,250 and is 
told that he can split this in any way he likes with Person Y (she).  Person Y can accept 
or reject the offer.  If Y accepts the offer then X and Y both get their money.  If she 
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rejects the offer then neither X nor Y get to keep the money.  Both parties are aware of 
the amount involved and the terms of the arrangement, but are anonymous to each other 
and cannot negotiate over the outcome.    
Participants were asked: (1) if you were person X, how much would you offer person Y?  (2) 
If you were person Y, what is the minimum offer you would accept from person X?  
Questions (3) and (4) were identical to questions (1) and (2), except that the amounts 
available to share between the proposer and responder were increased in proportion to the 
three earnings bands to $45,000, $165,000 and $277,500 respectively. 
According to the standard economic model (Henrich et al., 2001) the proposer should 
offer a nominal sum, which the responder should be prepared to accept, on the principle that 
something is better than nothing. However, Fehr & Schmidt (1999) postulate that, assuming 
that the total amount at stake (which we refer to as the ‘endowment’ and signify by E) equals 
1, then the majority of offers will be approximately equal to 0.5; that there will be no offers 
greater than 0.5; that very low offers are likely to be rejected (and hence are rarely made); 
that the probability of rejection decreases in inverse proportion to the size of the offer; and 
that offers of 0.5 will always be accepted. Fehr & Schmidt go on to note that these patterns 
are observable in a number of previous empirical studies and that the regularities hold good 
regardless of the amount of the endowment (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999: 826-827).   
Problem 2 
The second part of the study was based on a problem originally designed by Shafir, Diamond 
& Tversky (1997) which examined the importance of absolute rewards compared with 
rewards relative to salient others. The amounts reported here again refer to the base case. 
Jean is invited to join the senior management team of Company J with a total reward 
package worth $187,500.  Jacques, a contemporary of Jean’s with comparable expertise 
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and experience, is invited to join the senior management team of Company Q with a total 
reward package of $195,000.  Subsequently Jean discovers that the average total reward 
package of her peers in Company J’s management team is $180,000. Jacques discovers 
that the average total reward package of his peers in Company Q’s management team is 
$202,500.   All other things being equal, who do you think is likely to be more highly 
motivated? Possible answers: (A) Jean; (B) Jacques; (C) They are likely to be equally 
motivated. 
In this case, the standard economic model predicts that an agent would choose the higher 
absolute amount over the lower absolute amount, i.e., (B).  Exceptions to this general rule are 
possible if the agent views the situation as a repeated game, with the lower relative reward in 
round 1 signalling the possibility of both higher absolute and higher relative rewards in later 
rounds; see Nowak, Page & Sigmund (2000). However, in the present case the question was 
framed in such a way that it gave no indication that the game would be repeated. What 
predictions follow from Fehr & Schmidt’s model depends upon who, Jean or Jacques, or their 
peers in Company J and Q, is treated as the principal referent, and the relationship in each 
case between the respective coefficients for envy, α, and guilt, β. A decision matrix is set out 
in Table 2.  
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
In the top left-hand quadrant we are comparing Jean’s utility function: U(v) = $187,500 – 
αj$7,500 with Jacques’s utility function: U(v) = $195,000 – βq $7,500.  It can be seen that if 
βq ≤ 1 + αj, then Jacques is more motivated, and if βq = 1 + αj, then they are equally 
motivated. Only if βq > 1 + αj, is Jean more motivated. In the top right-hand quadrant we are 
comparing U(v) = $187,500 – αj $7,500 for Jean, with U(v) = $195,000 – αq $7,500 for 
Jacques. Jacques will be more motivated unless his coefficient for envy is significantly more 
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than that of Jean i.e., αq > 1 + αj. Similarly, in the bottom left-hand quadrant, Jacques will be 
more motivated unless his coefficient for guilt is significantly more than Jean’s i.e., βq> 1 + 
βj. In the bottom right-hand quadrant we are comparing Uj(v) = $187,500 – βj$7,500 for Jean 
with Uq(v) = $195,000 – αq $7,500 for Jacques. In this case Jean will be more motivated if 
Jacques’s envy is significantly greater than Jean’s guilt i.e., αq > βj + 1; otherwise Jacques 
will be more motivated.
 
The way the question is constructed makes the top left-hand and 
bottom-right hand quadrants the most logical frames of reference for respondents. 
 
Results 
Problem 1 
The results of the first part of the study are set out in a scatter diagram. Figure 1 shows the 
distribution of maximum offers and minimum acceptances. The smaller endowment in 
questions (1) and (2) is identified as E1 and the larger endowment in questions (3) and (4) is 
identified as E2. For the purposes of comparison, the monetary amounts offered by X and 
accepted by Y were normalised by converting them into fractions of E1 and E2, such that 0 ≤ 
x ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ y ≤ 1, where x is the maximum amount offered by X and y is the amount 
accepted by Y. There was a strong correlation (.571, p < .01) between the two distributions.   
The mean amount offered was .43 in the case of the smaller endowment and .41 in the case of 
the larger endowment. The mean amounts accepted were .41 in the first case and .38 in the 
second case. Standard deviations for both offers and acceptances were .21 in the case of the 
smaller endowment and .22 in the case of the larger endowment.   
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
A number of distinct patterns of responses can be observed in Figure 1.  A cluster of 
points (9.66% in the case of the smaller endowment, E1, and 14.68% in the case of the larger 
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endowment, E2) can be seen just above the origin representing relatively small maximum 
offers (x ≤ 0.1), matched by similarly small minimum acceptances (y ≤ 0.1). This is the 
standard economic rational choice: the proposer offers a nominal sum, which the responder is 
in turn prepared to accept. A much larger cluster (representing 42.33% of the sample for E1 
and for 41.53% E2) occurs around the point where the maximum amount offered and 
minimum amount accepted is between 0.4 and 0.5, implying an absolute standard of fairness 
on the part of participants who expected the stake to be shared equally between X and Y. This 
cluster cannot be explained by rational choice theory. A significant number of responses are 
on the line which proceeds at an angle of 45°, starting at the origin and ending at the centre 
point [0.5, 0.5], indicating that equal amounts are being offered and accepted. Excluding 
amounts already counted in the previous two categories, these represented an additional 
6.48% of the sample for E1 and 4.10% for E2. It implies that relative fairness was important to 
participants: their expectation was evidently that X and Y should expect to receive the same 
amount, whether acting as proposer or responder, although not necessarily as much as half of 
the endowment. As well as being fair in an intuitive sense, this is also a logical response in 
circumstances where the proposer assumes that the responder has the same utility function.  
Other points on the two charts are more widely dispersed. A number of participants 
(15.34% for E1, and 14.29% for E2) were prepared to offer up to 40% of the endowment, but 
would accept less. This constitutes a risk averse or strategic choice. Evidently the proposers 
wanted to be reasonably certain that the responders would accept their offers, by allowing for 
the possibility that the responders’ minimum acceptance levels were higher than their own.  
Conversely, some participants (6.48% for E1, and 6.75% for E2) wanted up to 50% of the 
endowment, but offered less than the minimum amount they were prepared to accept, 
indicative of risk-seeking - attempting to retain a higher proportion of the endowment by 
betting that the responder would be prepared to accept a smaller amount. These results are 
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also consistent with Fehr & Schmidt’s model. However, a number of participants (a total of 
19.71% for E1, and 18.65% for E2) confounded Fehr & Schmidt’s prediction that no one 
would offer more, nor accept less than one-half of the endowment. For the purposes of 
subsequent analysis we consider this conflicting data in two parts. First, data for which the 
minimum acceptance is greater than 0.5 fundamentally contradicts Fehr & Schmidt’s theory: 
because UY(0.5) = 0.5 > UY(y) where y > 0.5, regardless of the levels of envy and guilt, an 
offer of half the endowment should always be accepted.  Secondly, data for which the 
maximum offer is greater than 0.5 but the minimum acceptance is less than 0.5 is not 
predicted by the Fehr & Schmidt model, because Fehr & Schmidt anticipate that an offer of 
0.5 will always be accepted, so there is no logic to offering more. However, the result is not 
inconsistent with the model provided y ≤ 0.5: a possible explanation is that proposers who are 
very risk averse, imagining that responders might have high minimum acceptance levels, 
choose to make apparently excessive offers. We therefore distinguish between data points 
where y > 0.5 regardless of the value of x, which contradicts Fehr & Schmidt’s model, and 
data points where x > 0.5, y < 0.5, which are not necessarily incompatible with Fehr & 
Schmidt. These data are summarised in Table 3. 
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
Problem 2 
In the second part of the study, Jean, the executive receiving the lower absolute but higher 
relative amount was chosen by 345 participants (45.6%). Jacques, the executive receiving the 
higher absolute sum was chosen by 234 participants (31.0% of the total sample), with 177 
participants (23.4%) expressing the view that Jean and Jacques would be equally motivated.  
Comparable, but more pronounced, discrepancies between relative and absolute amounts 
were reported by Shafir et al., (1997). The standard economic model is unable to explain 
these results: according to the rational choice calculus an economic agent should always 
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choose a higher absolute amount over a lower absolute amount. Fehr & Schmidt’s model, on 
the other hand, is capable of providing an explanation. 
To see this, we can use the results of Problem 1 to estimate envy coefficients (which we 
refer to as α coefficients) for participants in the survey in order to make predictions about 
their preferences for Jean or Jacques in Problem 2. In the ultimatum game, if the offer by X is 
declined by the responder Y, then the resulting utility of both players is zero, i.e., UX (0) =   
UY (0) = 0. If the offer is accepted, then UY (y) ≥ 0. Therefore, an individual’s minimum 
acceptance will be the point at which UY (y) = 0. Given that UY (0.5) = 0.5 in all cases, the 
minimum acceptance will be in the range 0 ≤ y ≤ 0.5. From Fehr & Schmidt, we know that in 
this range UY(y) = y – α (1-2y), so that if UY(y) = 0, then α = y / (1-2y). We assume, based on 
the way that Problem 2 is framed (with each participant individually considering the cases of 
both executives) that participants will attribute to Jean and Jacques the same coefficients for 
envy and guilt. We know from Table 2 that, if α < 1 + β, then Fehr & Schmidt’s model 
predicts that Jacques will be regarded as being more motivated, regardless of his frame of 
reference. Jean will only be selected if α > 1 + β although, even in this case, Jacques will still 
be chosen if Jean and Jacques view each other as referents, rather than their company peers. 
Therefore, we would expect individuals selecting Jean to have higher α coefficients than 
participants choosing Jacques. We would also expect a rank order correlation between α 
scores and participants selecting, respectively: first, Jacques; secondly, indifference; and, 
thirdly, Jean. 
The mean minimum acceptances and implied α coefficients are set out in Table 4. These 
are derived from the responses to the ultimatum game for E1 and E2 for respondents selecting 
Jean or Jacques. Because we are using Fehr & Schmidt’s model to estimate α coefficients for 
each respondent, we include only data for survey participants whose responses to the 
ultimatum game are consistent with Fehr & Schmidt.  
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TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
Table 4 shows that participants choosing Jean over Jacques do on average have higher α 
coefficients. In the case of the smaller endowment, the mean implied α score for those 
selecting Jean is 1.51, compared with 1.17 for those choosing Jacques. In the case of the 
larger endowment, α coefficients are 1.16 and 0.89 respectively. As predicted there was a 
significant rank-order correlation (rs = .081, p < .05, n = 664 for the smaller endowment and 
rs = .088, p < .05, n = 665 for the larger endowment). The number of participants selecting 
Jean with α coefficients greater than 2.0, as predicted by Fehr & Schmidt, is 182 out of a total 
of 306 (59.48%) in the case of the smaller endowment, and 178 out of 300 (59.33%) in the 
case of the larger endowment. Conversely, the number of participants choosing Jacques with 
α coefficients ≤ 0.1 is only 39 (12.75%) in the case of the smaller endowment and 52 
(17.33%) in the case of the larger endowment. Although not a proof, these findings are 
consistent with Fehr & Schmidt’s fairness model. We comments further on these results 
below in the discussion section. 
 
Discussion 
The results show the inadequacies of the standard economic model in providing explanations 
for these phenomena, and that Fehr & Schmidt’s model is much better able to explain the 
data. In the first problem, fairness theory accounts for around 88% of the data (87.83% for E1 
and 87.96% for E2), compared with the much small proportion which is explained by the 
rational choice model (9.66% for E1 and 14.68% for E2). In the second problem, over 45% of 
survey participants (306 out of 664 participants in the case of the smaller endowment and 300 
out of 665 in the case of the larger endowment) make choices which indicate a very strong 
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preference for fairness. The results demonstrate that senior executives are concerned about 
fairness to a significant extent, thus answering the first part of the research question. 
However, Fehr & Schmidt’s model is not able to explain why, in the first of the two 
research problems, around 12% of participants claim more than 50% of the endowment. Nor 
is it able to explain why, in the second problem, more than 100 participants with α 
coefficients > 2.0 choose Jacques and not Jean; or why 39 (E1) and 52 (E2) participants with α 
≤ 0.1 choose Jean and not Jacques. We address these matters below under the sub-heading of 
‘greed’. Three further issues are raised by the second problem. The first concerns context: it 
is a relevant factor that Jean and Jacques are both members of senior management teams; 
Company J and Company Q will presumably be more interested in maximizing the total 
utilities of their management teams than the single utilities of individual team members. The 
second is the question of identity. The example makes it clear that the identities of the parties 
are relevant to their preferences: Jean may envy Jacques as well as Jacques’s total reward; 
Jacques may be jealous of his peers in Company Q as well as their level of earnings. The 
third is the issue of their respective contributions, i.e., the ability and effort which Jean and 
Jacques supply to their employers in return for their rewards. Jean may be less envious of 
Jacques if she senses that he receives a larger reward in return for greater ability or greater 
effort. Jacques may be less jealous of his peers if he recognises that their contributions to 
Company Q are greater than his. We address these issues below under the sub-heading 
‘refining the fairness model’, before commenting on the implications of our findings for 
agency theory, tournament theory, and the design of top-management team incentives.   
Greed 
Table 5 shows how in problem 2 the proportion selecting Jean and Jacques differs between 
low envy (α ≤ 0.1) and high envy (α ≥ 2.0) groups. Setting aside the proportion of indifferent 
responses, which is fairly consistent across the categories, there is a significantly higher 
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propensity to select Jean in the high envy group. As we have already noted, this is consistent 
with Fehr & Schmidt’s theory, as the requirement αq > βj + 1 is almost certainly satisfied: β = 
1.0 implies an agent would be as happy having nothing as everything, which seems highly 
implausible and is why Fehr & Schmidt impose the condition β ≤ 1.0; indeed any result 
where β > 0.5 would appear to be unlikely, as it would imply that increasing guilt outweighs 
the marginal utility of wealth.  
TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
However, it will be observed that 27-28% of executives in the high-envy group still 
select Jacques, which is not predicted by Fehr & Schmidt. This might be because some 
participants take the view that Jean and Jacques always regard each other as their primary 
reference points, in which case Jacques will always be selected. At the other end of the 
spectrum, while preferences for Jacques are more prevalent than for the high envy group, as 
predicted, there are still a large number of respondents in the low envy group (39 for E1 and 
52 for E2) who select Jean. Under Fehr & Schmidt’s model, this can only be explained by 
assuming that there is a sufficient proportion of participants for whom β < 0, so that the 
condition αq > βj + 1 is still satisfied even as α tends to zero. Fehr & Schmidt (1999: 824) do 
recognise the possibility that β < 0, which they refer to as ‘status seeking’. We prefer to 
describe β < 0 as ‘greed’, recognising that for some people the selfish desire for personal 
reward trumps any desire for fairness. Robertson (2001: 22-23) defines greed in terms of 
wants, needs and entitlements.  In its broadest sense (preferred by Robertson) greed occurs 
where wants exceed needs. In a narrower sense (preferred by us) greed occurs where wants 
exceed both needs and entitlements. There is also a visceral quality to greed (Robertson, 
2001: 14-19), so that including greed in the model is consistent with views expressed by 
Elster (1996) about the importance of recognising emotion as a factor in economic 
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calculations.  Therefore, we propose that greed should be incorporated into the fairness 
framework by allowing β < 0, in which circumstances the coefficient for guilt (β ≥ 0) 
becomes a coefficient for greed (β < 0).  While, prima facie, this is not a major feature of the 
data, the number of senior executives participating in the study for whom β < 0 is not 
insignificant, so that β ≥ 0 cannot be assumed in the way it is by Fehr & Schmidt (1999: 824). 
We do not pursue this phenomenon further in the current paper, but note the impact of greed 
on executive pay as an item for further research. 
Refining the fairness model 
The analysis to this point provides empirical evidence in support of the proposition that 
fairness matters to senior executives as it does for other workers, albeit that the presence of 
negative β means that in some circumstances the effects may be more muted. Fehr & 
Schmidt’s model, despite its relative simplicity and high level of abstraction, has proved to be 
an effective framework for explaining the data.   However, Fehr & Schmidt focus on the 
impact of differential reward outcomes, and the questions in our study imply no difference in 
the extent to which rewards are deserved.  In order to draw inferences from the theory for 
senior executive incentive design, the model needs to be refined to allow for the possibility of 
differential inputs and hence for the possibility that differential levels of reward might be 
perceived to be fair. 
Akerlof and Kranton (2000) argue that the identity of an economic agent  (e.g., X in 
terms of the initial definitions of fairness and envy in this paper) affects his utility function 
and should therefore be taken into account in the economic calculus. The identity of a 
referent (e.g., Y) may also affect the utility function of X: i.e., X may envy Y rather than just 
y. The choice by both Varian and Baumol of the word ‘envy’, a characteristically emotive 
term, is potentially significant.  In the present context, this means that envy is a phenomenon 
which involves both a comparison of two bundles of goods (x and y) and an emotional 
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reaction (of X to Y); X envies Y (the person) and y (the bundle of goods); to ignore the 
emotional component runs the risk of misunderstanding the phenomenon. In Rawlsian terms 
this is ‘envy proper’ rather than ‘benign envy’ (Rawls, 1971|1999: 467).     
Allowing for the fact that the identity of the two economic agents is a relevant factor, we 
must also recognise the possibility that X and Y may make differential contributions (e.g., in 
terms of their ability and effort) prior to receiving x and y, and that his perception of these 
differential contributions might be taken into account by X as he weighs the extent to which 
he envies or does not envy the bundle of goods y obtained by Y. To allow for this we 
incorporate equity theory (Adams, 1965). Adams explains equity in the context of social 
exchange in terms of X’s perception of the costs of his inputs (i.e., what X must do to obtain 
x) and the value of his outputs (i.e., the bundle of goods x obtained by X as a reward) versus 
the perceived cost of Y’s inputs (i.e., what she must do to obtain y) and Y’s perceived outputs 
(i.e., her bundle of goods y); formally:  
(	

 ) : ( 

 )       (2) 
where Ox are the outputs of the first agent, X, e.g., his compensation, Ix is the first agent’s 
inputs e.g., his ability and effort, Oy are the outputs of the second agent, Y, and Iy is her 
inputs. Inequity is perceived by X to exist if (	

) ≠ ( 
	
	. If ( 

	) ≤ ( 

	) he feels envy and if 



 ) ≥ ( 

 ) he feels guilt (Adams, 1965).   
Incorporating the concept of identity and the Adams’ ratio into Fehr & Schmidt’s utility 
function enables us to generate a new version of the fairness model. It assumes that X will 
assess both the identity of, and the contribution provided by, X, to earn vx, and by Y to earn 
vy. We represent this as follows: 
 
Ux(v) = vx - αx max [	
	
		-		

	
	), 0] - βx max [	
	
	 -  

	
	), 0] 
        (3) 
Factor for envy Factor for guilt / greed 
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where Ux(v) is the utility of the payment to X, vx is the value of the payment as perceived by 
X, vy is X’s perception of the value of the payment to Y, cx is the contribution made by X in 
return for vx, cy is X’s perception of the contribution made by Y in return for vy, αx is the 
coefficient for envy, such that αx ≥ 0, and βx is the coefficient for guilt, such that 0 ≤  βx ≤ 1, 
or greed in case that βx < 0. 
We recognise that the Equation (3) may not be strictly solvable because perceptions are 
involved: X’s perceptions of vx, cx, vy and cy may be different from Y’s perceptions of vx, cx, 
vy and cy; the equation is therefore not as mathematically tractable as Fehr & Schmidt’s 
original model. Festinger recognised this type of problem with social comparisons in the way 
that he talked about evaluations being ‘unstable’ (Festinger, 1954; Corollary IIA). However, 
we contend that the framework is analytically sound, that it helps to explain the importance of 
equitable payment, and that this is more important than mathematical tractability. 
Top-management team perspective 
The fairness model provides important insights into the optimal design of incentives in teams. 
Two seminal works on teams by economists are Marschak & Radner (1972) and Alchian & 
Demsetz (1972), although in both cases the focus is on information sharing. Holmstrom 
(1982) studies moral hazard in teams, with a particular focus on free-riding and internal 
competition, again primarily from an information economics perspective. Lindenberg & Foss 
(2011) and Foss & Lindenberg (2012) examine the relationship between group agency, 
motivation, and joint production, but not specifically the part played by fairness. Henderson 
& Fredrickson (2001), Siegel & Hambrick (2005) and Fredrickson, Davis-Blake &Sanders 
(2010) comment on the implications of pay disparities in top-management teams, citing 
evidence that collaboration diminishes when large pay disparities exist.   
It is evident from our study that perceived fairness will affect team motivation. If we 
make the not unreasonable assumption that individual team members treat other members as 
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key referents (Trevor & Wazeter, 2006), then it is relatively easy to demonstrate by 
mathematical deduction that the combined total utility of team members is maximised when 
the Adams’ ratio is in equilibrium. To illustrate this, consider a team with two members. 
Their individual utilities are calculated by substituting them, in turn, for X and Y in the 
fairness function given by Equation (3). Assuming that the two team members feel envy and 
guilt in equal measure, if 
	
 =	

		
 , then envy and guilt cancel each other out.  If, however, 
	
 
> 

	
  or 

	
 <  

	
  , then total team utility will be reduced by some combination of envy and 
guilt. A formal proof is provided in the Appendix. The proof assumes α + β ≥ 0, which is 
consistent with Fehr & Schmidt’s original assumption. Alternatively, if β < 0 (see above 
under the sub-heading of greed) then the constraint still holds if |α| > |β|, i.e., envy weighs 
heavier than greed.  Tournament theory would still be consistent with scenarios where |β| > 
|α|, but firms may not wish to encourage a culture of greed. This argument supports the 
proposition that fairness matters in top-management teams.  It is consistent with the findings 
of Henderson & Fredrickson (2001) (better firm performance is observed where equity 
considerations within top-management teams are weighed against tournament-like 
incentives), Siegel & Hambrick (2005) (in technologically-intensive companies greater pay 
dispersion within top-management teams is harmful to firm performance) and Fredrickson, 
Davis-Blake & Sanders (2010) (social comparisons among top-management team members 
mean that greater pay dispersion is negatively related to firm performance). 
 
Conclusions 
This study has demonstrated that fairness considerations are salient to senior executives.  It 
provides evidence that the prevalent currently-held view of senior executive pay practices, 
which emphasises the importance of high-powered incentives and pay-for-individual-
performance, underestimates the role and significance of fairness. It can be inferred from this 
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that, in order to maximise the total motivation of top-management teams (which, according to 
behavioural agency theory, is causally connected with superior business performance; see 
Finkelstein, Hambrick, & Cannella, 2009; and Pepper & Gore, 2012), companies should 
design incentives which take account of equity considerations. 
We contribute to the literature on fairness, agency, tournaments and executive pay in 
various ways. First, we propose various modifications to the model of fairness proposed by 
Fehr & Schmidt (1999), allowing for differential contributions by agents, and recognising 
that, in some circumstances, ‘greed’ may have to be substituted for ‘guilt’ (i.e., by admitting 
the possibility of β < 0). We contend that this revised fairness model is particularly relevant 
to (behavioural) agency theory, thus responding to the call for the development of a specific 
theory of fairness that is appropriate to principal-agent relationships (Bowie & Freeman, 
1992: 50-51). Secondly, by demonstrating the extent to which fairness considerations are 
salient to senior executives, we provide support for criticisms of agency theory (e.g., those 
advanced by Bowie & Freeman, 1992) and tournament theory (e.g., O'Reilly et al., 1988) 
who argue that standard versions of these theories do not take equity into account.  This is 
especially pertinent in multi-agency situations, for example where shareholders wish to 
optimise the performance of top-management teams.  In this way, we add to the growing 
literature on behavioural-agency theory (Pepper & Gore, 2012, 2014; Rebitzer & Taylor, 
2011; Sanders & Carpenter, 2003; Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998), which is endeavouring 
to enhance the explanatory and predictive power of agency theory by combining ideas from 
the economics and management literatures and by incorporating a more realistic set of 
behavioural assumptions.  
The approach which we have taken in this paper has been exploratory, looking for patterns 
in the data and seeking explanations for those patterns in existing theory, before integrating 
the theory and findings to construct new theory (Bewley, 1999).  In this sense it does not 
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offer a formal proof of the main propositions, and more empirical research is in order. 
Furthermore, although Fehr & Schmidt’s model explains more of the data in the empirical 
study than standard economic theory, it does not explain everything; an account of why some 
participants in the ultimatum game will only accept more than 0.5 of the endowment is still 
required.  We also need to clarify why in Problem 2 some participants with low α coefficients 
choose Jean. We have speculated that a possible explanation lies in relaxing one the 
constraints imposed by Fehr & Schmidt, allowing β < 0, thus converting guilt into greed.  In 
extremis, this proposition might have implications for some of our other conclusions; 
however, we do not pursue this possibility further in the current paper.  
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Table 1 Demographics 
 
Variable   All participants 
 
 n = 756 
  
f %  f % 
Indicative total earnings   Industry sector (continued)   
≤ $350,000 505 66.9% Energy, Utilities & Mining 23 3.0% 
$350,000 > w >  $725,000 178 23.6% Engineering & Construction 53 7.0% 
≥ $725,000   72 9.5% Entertainment & Media 22 2.9% 
Job title   Financial Services 37 4.9% 
Chairman   61   8.0% Forestry, Paper & Packaging 12 1.6% 
CEO/President/MD 293 38.8% Government & Public Sector 10 1.3% 
CFO/Treasurer   64   8.5% Healthcare 34 4.5% 
CIO/Technology Director   90 11.9% Hospitality & Leisure 22 2.9% 
Other C-level Executive   72   9.5% Industrial Manufacturing 54 7.2% 
Vice-President/Director 144 19.0% Insurance 23 3.0% 
Head of Business Unit     5   0.7% Metals 14 1.9% 
Head of Department   11   1.5% Oil and Gas 17 2.2% 
Senior Manager     3   0.4% Pharmaceuticals 15 2.0% 
Other Senior Executive   13   1.7% Retail & Consumer 60 7.9% 
Age:    Technology 69 9.1% 
Under 39 194 25.7% Transport & Logistics 26 3.4% 
40-44 142 18.8% Other 76 10.1% 
45-49 143 18.9% Country   
50-54 115 15.2% United States 123 16.3% 
55-59   80 10.6% United Kingdom   34 4.5% 
60-64   51   6.7% France   35 4.6% 
65 +   31   4.1% Netherlands   55 7.3% 
Gender   Switzerland   40 5.3% 
Male 619 81.9% Germany   31 4.1% 
Female 137 18.1% Spain   30 4.0% 
Industry sector   Russia   45 6.0% 
Aerospace 12 1.6% Poland   30 4.0% 
Defense   6 0.8% Brazil   52 6.9% 
Asset Management   9 1.2% Mexico   28 3.7% 
Automotive 14 1.9% China   51 6.7% 
Banking & Capital Markets 38 5.0% India   31 4.1% 
Business services 55 7.4% Australia   31 4.1% 
Capital & Infrastructure 17 2.2% Middle East   75 9.9% 
Chemicals    20    2.6% South Africa   31 4.1% 
Communications    18    2.4% Other   34  4.4% 
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Table 2   Predicted results in the second problem according to Fehr & Schmidt, 1999 
 
 Jacques treats Jean as his principal 
referent 
Jacques treats his peers in Company Q 
as his principal referents 
 
Jean treats 
Jacques as her 
principal referent 
 
Jacques will be more motivated, 
unless βq > 1 + αj  
 
Jacques will be more motivated 
unless αq > 1 + αj 
Jean treats         
her peers in  
Company J as her 
principal referents 
Jacques will be more motivated 
unless βq > 1 + βj. 
Jean will be more motivated  
if αq > βj + 1; otherwise Jacques 
will be more motivated 
 
 
 
 
Table 3   Results of the two-part ultimatum gain 
Results categories 
 
Small Endowment Large Endowment 
   n        %   n      % 
Rational choice option      
Small x and y x, y ≤ 0.1 73 9.66% 111 14.68% 
Fair options 
Absolute fairness 0.4 ≤ x, y ≤ 0.5 320 42.33% 314 41.53% 
Relative fairness Other cases of  x = y 49 6.48% 31 4.10% 
Risk adjusted options     
Risk averse, y ≤ 0.5 x > y, x,y ≤ 0.5 116 15.34% 108 14.29% 
Risk seeking, y ≤ 0.5 x < y, x,y ≤ 0.5 49 6.48% 51 6.75% 
Risk averse, y  > 0.5 x > y, y > 0.5 57 7.54% 50 6.61% 
Total consistent with Fehr & Schmidt 664 87.83% 665 87.96% 
Greed x < y, y > 0.5 92 12.17% 91 12.04% 
Total 
 
756 100.00% 756 100.00% 
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Table 4   Estimating Jean and Jacques’s coefficients for envy 
Problem 2: 
participants 
choosing… 
Problem 1: minimum amount accepted 
Smaller endowment Larger endowment 
n Mean Std. deviation 
Implied 
α 
n Mean Std. deviation 
Implied 
α 
Jacques 196 0.35 0.18 1.17 206 0.32 0.20 0.89 
Indifferent 162 0.38 0.17 1.51 159 0.34 0.20 1.08 
Jean 306 0.38 0.16 1.51 300 0.35 0.19 1.16 
Total 664 0.37 0.17 1.40 665 0.34 0.19 1.05 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5   Distribution of results in Problem 2 
α coefficient 
Minimum amount accepted in Problem 1 
Smaller endowment      Larger endowment 
Jean Jacques Indifferent Total Jean Jacques Indifferent Total 
α ≤ 0.1   39   31   20   90   52   50   35 137 
0.1 < α ≤ 2.0 
  85   59   41 185   70   48   29 147 
α > 2.0 182 106 101 389 178 108   95 381 
Total 306 196 162 664 300 206 159 665 
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Figure 1   Distribution of the Results of the Ultimatum Game 
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Appendix   Proof of the importance of fairness in a team context 
I. Assume that α + β ≥ 0, i.e., either that α, β ≥ 0 or, if β < 0, that |α| > |β| 
II. Given that: 
 
(i) X and Y are members of a two person team T,  i.e., T: (X, Y) 
(ii) X’s utility function is:  Ux(v) = vx - αx max [	
	
		-		



	), 0] - βx max [	


	 -  

	
	), 0] 
(iii) Y’s utility function is:  Uy(v) = vy - αy max [	
	
		-		

	
	), 0] - βy max [	
	
	 -  

	
	), 0] 
(iv) We want to maximise team utility, i.e., Ut(v) = Ux(v) + Uy(v) 
III. Let  	
	
	) = δ and ( 
	
	) = ε 
IV. We know (from I.) that:  
Ut(v) =  vx – αx max [(ε-δ),0] – βx max [(δ-ε),0] + vy – αy max [(δ-ε),0] – βy max [(ε-δ),0] 
V. If we assume that ε > δ, then: 
 
(i) Ut(v) =  vx – αx (ε-δ) +vy – βy (ε-δ) 
(ii) Ut(v) =  vx + vy – αx (ε-δ) – βy (ε-δ) 
(iii) Ut(v) =  (vx + vy) – (αx + βy) (ε-δ) 
Therefore, because (αx+βy) > 0 and (ε-δ) > 0, then: 
(iv) (vx + vy) > (vx + vy) – (αx + βy) (ε-δ) 
VI. If, alternatively, we assume that δ > ε, then: 
 
(i) Ut(v) =  vx – βx (δ-ε) + vy - αy (δ-ε) 
(ii) Ut(v) =  vx + vy – βx (δ-ε) - αy (δ-ε) 
(iii) Ut(v) =  (vx + vy) – (αy+βx) (δ-ε) 
Because (αy+βx) > 0 and (δ-ε) > 0, then: 
(iv) (vx + vy) > (vx + vy) – (αy + βx) (δ-ε) 
VII. If, as a further alternative, we assume that δ = ε, therefore: 
(i) Because (ε – δ) = (δ – ε) = 0 
(ii) Then Ut(v) =  vx+ vy  
VIII. Thus Ut (v) is maximised when δ = ε, i.e., when	
	
 = ( 
	
	).  QED.    
